Raz - Month # 3

The two books for March differ in significant ways. While Allen’s The Business of Genocide puts much emphasis on the ideological dimensions related to German (mis)management of genocide in Nazi-dominated Europe, Dean’s Robbing the Jews explores the economic side of the Holocaust. Whereas Dean strives to portray a rational mechanism that worked, Allen argues that even when Nazi fixations involved fascinations with modern rationality, underlying ideological goals and consensus doomed the major Nazi economic initiatives to failure and self-destruction.   

            Allen’s analysis combines meticulous research in previously unutilized primary sources with a deep understanding of modern management theories and practices. He skillfully criticizes past assertions in scholarly accounts that rested on little more than theoretical musings detached from specific data and contexts (i.e., Weber, Sofsky [see p. 260], and Bauman [see p. 127], among others). He refutes the notion of a faceless Nazi bureaucracy, characterized at times by endless infighting. (Oxymoronic formulations at any rate, for how could faceless figures engage in struggles that in effect required various faces?) Instead, he demonstrates the principal agreements among the many Germans involved in the planning and implementation of mass murder. Indeed, “[t]his book argues that ideology is embedded in the quotidian tasks of bureaucratic operations because it lies at the root of collective identity and consensus” (p. 11). Allen has provided numerous examples that show beyond doubt that in Nazi Germany “…the state is not there for the economy, but the economy is there for the state.” (Quoted on p. 32, and see also quote before fn. 57 on p. 81 and before fn. 16 on p. 101) Therefore, “…ideology and organization became one and the same thing.” (p. 49, and see also pp. 159, 189), creating an irrationality that stood at the heart of Nazi fundamentalism’s “productivism.” This state of affairs eventually brought about financial ruin on most SS business endeavors.

            In conclusion, criticizing the idea that “[m]any would have us believe that not only did the Holocaust’s victims come like sheep to the slaughter, but their Nazi butchers did so as well” (p. 260), Allen has shown the consensus that ensured the success of mass murder over and above economic considerations.

            Dean’s focus on the theft of money, valuables, and property of Jews before, during, and after their murder provides a useful overview, some intriguing glimpses into archival documents that researchers have yet to examine thoroughly, and a few spotlights on issues marginalized in current scholarship (such as the German method of blocking bank accounts owned by Jews). However, his use of primary sources gives a somewhat anecdotal impression, and the data he provides fails to convince that assets of Jews contributed significantly to the financial state of Nazi Germany – a central thesis of the book.     

Nevertheless, Dean has contributed several important insights that deserve attention and further research. He has noted the dehumanizing effect of German economic persecution (p. 8); he has also briefly mentioned comparisons between such measures aimed at different groups (p. 13); he has posited that mass robbery reinforced genocide by reducing victims’ chances of survival (p. 221) and by spreading complicity across Europe (pp. 15, 357, 389); and he asserted that “…postwar communist expropriations served to consolidate the theft of Jewish property conducted during the war.” (p. 357).

In addition, Dean has corroborated some of Allen’s arguments, even if only in passing. He pointed out the cooperation rather than contentious struggles among German agencies involved in genocide (p. 255). He has also stated explicitly that in the Occupied East the destruction of Jewish communities occurred because of “…ideological reasons,” not economic gains (p. 174, and see, related to this point, p. 36). And finally, he has, as mentioned above, unintentionally shown that the material benefits of robbing the Jews were actually quite small (See the figures and information on pp. 57-58, 168, 255, 392). Indeed, Allen’s conclusions about the gold taken from east European Jews during “Operation Reinhard” (p. 249) illuminates the conceptual problem that plagues Dean’s account – the value of the gold was minuscule in comparison to the needs of the German war economy at the time, and, moreover, that gold ended up supporting imaginary SS initiatives concerned with future visions that in 1943 seemed extremely absurd.

It is telling that an account meant to stress the economic aspects of the Holocaust eventually proves that this unprecedented genocide happened not because human beings are for the most part greedy but because many people at the time sincerely believed – albeit in various ways – or found an anchor in what Allen has termed Nazi fundamentalism.